Robust cross-country analysis of inequality of opportunity by Andreoli, Francesco & Fusco, Alessio
Economics Letters 182 (2019) 86–89
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Economics Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Robust cross-country analysis of inequality of opportunity
Francesco Andreoli a,b,∗, Alessio Fusco b
a Department of Economics, University of Verona, Via Cantarane 24, 37129 Verona, Italy
b Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research - LISER, LISER, 11 Porte des Sciences, L-4366, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
h i g h l i g h t s
• Gap curves are useful for robust cross-country analysis of inequality of opportunity.
• We propose a formal test for equality of opportunity in each country.
• We propose a formal test for differences in inequality of opportunity between countries.
• We illustrate our approach using EU-SILC data.
• We can robustly rank the 16 countries in about half of cross-country comparisons.
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a b s t r a c t
International rankings of countries based on inequality of opportunity indices may not be robust vis-à-
vis the specific metric adopted to measure opportunities. Indices often aggregate relevant information
and neglect to control for normatively irrelevant distributional factors. This paper shows that gap
curves can be estimated from cross-sectional data and adopted to test hypotheses about robust
cross-country comparisons of (in)equality of opportunity.
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Equality of opportunity (EOp) theory distinguishes between
illegitimate sources of inequality that deserve compensation (e.g.
parental background) and legitimate ones (e.g. effort) – see Roe-
mer and Trannoy (2016). Opportunities are unequally distributed
if some individuals enjoy an illegitimate advantage with respect
to others, in relation to circumstances beyond their control. In-
equality of Opportunity (IOp) indices operationalize this notion
(Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016).
Empirical studies focusing on earnings inequality have found
that IOp is only a small fraction of total inequality. This might
be due to observability constraints (Niehues and Peichl, 2014),
as well as to heterogeneity in earnings opportunities. Firstly,
IOp indices aggregate heterogeneity in the distribution of ille-
gitimate advantage across circumstances groups, thus discarding
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potentially relevant information. Secondly, IOp indices neglect the
role of covariates which are not illegitimate drivers of inequality
(such as age and marital status), but that are correlated with
circumstances (older cohorts have on average less educated par-
ents) and explain earnings heterogeneity (older cohorts/married
individuals display higher earnings, see Balcázar, 2015). Paramet-
ric models have been developed (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011)
to account for the role of covariates, at the cost of introducing
specification bias.
International rankings based on IOp indices may hence not be
robust vis-à-vis the selected IOp metric. We address this issue
by introducing gap curves in the cross-country analysis of IOp. A
gap curve depicts the gap between opportunity profiles attributed
to different circumstances in a given country. When there is
no gap in opportunity profiles, there is strong evidence of EOp.
Otherwise, IOp prevails. Our first contribution is to show that
gap curves (i) can be used to tests hypothesis about EOp in each
country and (ii) can be contrasted across countries to test for
differences in IOp. The normative underpinnings of the ordering
induced by non-intersecting gap curves have been detailed in
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.005
0165-1765/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
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Andreoli et al. (2019). Our second contribution shows that un-
conditional gap curves for each country can be flexibly estimated
using distribution regression methods, controlling for the effect
of irrelevant covariates on opportunity profiles. We tests EOp and
IOp for earnings in Europe using the European Union-Survey on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC).
2. Concepts
Let earnings ys(c, ε) in country s depend on circumstances
c ∈ {c1, . . . , cN}, defining types, and on distributional factors ε,
characterizing within-type earning heterogeneity. Some factors
in ε are rewarded by the market, such as effort or talent, while
others are irrelevant from a normative perspective, such as age
and marital status. The object of interest is the opportunity set,
depicting the distribution of potential earnings accruing to type-
c individuals. The set coincides with the conditional cdf Fs(y|c)
for a group of homogeneous individuals. In applied analysis,
Fs(y|c) is often (non-parametrically) estimated from data about
earnings and circumstances, neglecting the contribution of po-
tential earnings heterogeneity driven by normatively irrelevant
covariates.
The gap curve Γs
(
c, c ′, p
)
depicts the empirical distribution of
the unfair gap between opportunity sets of types c and c ′, and is
defined:
Γs
(
c, c ′, p
)
:= F−1s (p|c)− F−1s
(
p|c ′)∀c ̸= c′ and p ∈ [0, 1] ,
where F−1s (p|c) is the conditional quantile function correspond-
ing to population share p (Fig. 1 displays an example). EOp
imposes linear restrictions on the gap curve, leading to testable
hypothesis:
HEOp0 :Γs
(
c, c ′, p
) = 0,∀c ̸= c ′,∀p ∈ [0, 1].
EOp holds in country s (HEOp0 not rejected) whenever opportu-
nity sets coincide across all pairs c ̸= c ′. Otherwise, a form of IOp
prevails. Indices can be used to rank countries by IOp. Many IOp
indices are related to gap curves (see Andreoli and Fusco, 2017),
including the Gini-opportunity index by Lefranc et al. (2008):
GO (s) := I (µc1 · (1− Gc1) , . . . , µcN · (1− GcN ))
= 1
2µs
∑
i
∑
j
wci · wcj ·
⏐⏐⏐⏐∫ 1
0
(1− p) · Γs
(
ci, cj, p
)
dp
⏐⏐⏐⏐ ,
wherewc is circumstance c weight and µs the average earnings in
the country. The GO incorporates efficiency (µc) and equity (Gini
index Gc) concerns about the distribution of opportunities Fs(y|c).
Rankings of countries based on IOp indices, including GO,
are not robust to the selected IOp metric. Gap curves allow
to compare countries on the basis of the whole distribution of
opportunity gaps between any pair c ̸= c′. Our baseline null
hypothesis is that gap curves in countries s and s′ coincide:
H IOp0 :∆Γ
(
c, c ′, p
) = Γs (c, c ′, p)− Γs′ (c, c ′, p) = 0,
∀c ̸= c ′ ∀p ∈ [0, 1].
Two countries are indistinguishable from a IOp perspective
whenever H IOp0 cannot be rejected. Rejection implies that fairness
gaps between types differ across countries, albeit in an unre-
stricted way. Gap curves for types c ̸= c ′ may cross, in which
case the distribution of unfair advantage depends on relevant
distributional factors and countries cannot be robustly ordered.
Alternatively, the gap curve for types c ̸= c ′ in country s dom-
inates that of country s′, i.e., Γs
(
c, c ′, .
)
is never below and it is
sometimes above Γs′
(
c, c ′, .
)
. If there is strong dominance across
all pairs c ̸= c ′ for which ∆Γ (c, c ′, .) ̸= 0, then there is robust
evidence that opportunities are more unequally distributed in
country s compared to s′ (Andreoli et al., 2019).
3. Estimation of unconditional gap curves
We estimate gap curves at a finite number of intercepts p ∈
{p1, . . . , pM} using Recentered Influence Function (RIF) approxi-
mations of the quantile function (Firpo et al., 2009). The influence
function of a quantile, IF
(
F−1 (p)
) = 1−p
f (F−1(p)) , measures the
effect (by linearizing the inverse function) of a contamination
in the data on that specific quantile. The RIF estimator yields
unbiased estimates of the unconditional quantiles of the distri-
bution. We provide RIF estimators for unconditional gap curves.
For a given country and circumstance type, we first estimate
linear probability regressions of an indicator 1 (yι ≥ y), taking
value 1 when observed income yι is larger than a predetermined
threshold y, on parental circumstances and covariates Xι (such as
age and marital status):
∀s,∀i = 1, . . . , C: 1 (yι ≥ y) = αsi (y)
+
∑
j̸=i
βsij (y) · 1
(
ι is of type cj
)+ X ι · γsi (y)+ uι(y).
Income thresholds y in model i coincide with the observed
quantiles of the conditional distributions Fs(y|ci) for each type
separately.
The coefficients α, β and γ can be estimated using cross-
sectional data. For country s and population share p, we estimate
two effects: βsij(y) and β
s
ji(y). The first effect provides an estimate
of the probability gap Fs
(
y|cj
)−Fs (y|ci) at earnings y = F−1s (p|ci).
Similarly, the second effect measures Fs (y|ci) − Fs
(
y|cj
)
at earn-
ings y = F−1s
(
p|cj
)
. We apply the IF formula above to obtain
estimates of the gap curve coordinates, expressed in the space
of earnings. Since the quantiles F−1s (p|ci) and F−1s
(
p|cj
)
do not
generally coincide, we use the average effect as a reliable estimate
of the unconditional gap curve. This gives:
Γˆs
(
ci, cj, p
) = 1
2
[
βsji
(
F−1s
(
p|cj
))
fs
(
F−1s
(
p|cj
) |cj) − β
s
ij
(
F−1s (p|ci)
)
fs
(
F−1s (p|ci) |ci
)]
∀c ̸= c′ and p ∈ [0, 1],
where fs(y|ci) is the density of the conditional distribution (non-
parametrically identified) of type ci earnings opportunities.
Gap curves are estimated at earnings deciles (M = 10),
their variance–covariance matrices are bootstrapped. Assuming
normality, HEOp0 and H
IOp
0 can be tested against an unrestricted
alternative using χ2M−1-distributed joint equality tests for vectors
of quantiles estimates. We use t-tests of quantile-specific differ-
ences in gap curves to test Γs
(
c, c ′, p
) − Γs′ (c, c ′, p) ≥ 0,∀p ∈
[0, 1] (dominance) for those pairs c ̸= c ′ for which H IOp0 is rejected
among countries s and s′. GO (s) is estimated from empirical gap
curves via numerical integration methods, thus controlling for
normatively irrelevant factors.
4. Empirical illustration
We use the 2011 EU-SILC module on ‘‘intergenerational trans-
mission of disadvantage’’ to test EOp and IOp for earnings ac-
quisition across 16 European countries. Parental education (high,
medium, low) defines three types. Our sample includes male
full-time employed aged 30–50 (see Andreoli and Fusco, 2017
for details). Estimates are always conditional on age and marital
status.
Countries in Table 1 are arranged by increasing GO. Countries
that display similar GO levels are statistically indistinguishable,
while the ranking of the other countries stems from marginal
differences in IOp (below diagonal, ‘‘=’’ indicates insignificant
differences at 5% level). We use gap curves to qualify these results.
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Fig. 1. Gap curves in selected countries (with 95% CI).
Our first result (diagonal in Table 1) is that in about half of
the countries, EOp is rejected across all three comparisons: high
vs medium, high vs low and medium vs low parental education.
In the remaining countries (including the Nordic), HEOp0 is not
rejected for only one pair of types. This is strong evidence against
EOp in Europe. We contrast gap curves across countries to test for
robust IOp orderings.
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Table 1
Tests for EOp and IOp, 16 EU-SILC countries, 2011.
Country GO Comparison country
NL FI DE SK NO SE IS AT BE PL UK EE LT HU IE LU
NL 0.023 2 0 0 n.o. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
FI 0.026 = 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
DE 0.028 = = 3 n.o. 0 0 0 0 0 n.o. 1 0 n.o. 1 0 2
SK 0.028 = = = 2 0 0 1 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 2 2
NO 0.028 = = = = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.o. 0 1 2
SE 0.032 = = = = = 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.o. 0 1 2
IS 0.036 = = = = = = 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
AT 0.042 > = = = = = = 3 0 n.o. 0 0 1 n.o. 1 2
BE 0.043 > = > > = = = = 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 2
PL 0.045 > > > > > = = = = 3 1 0 n.o. 0 2 2
UK 0.046 > > > > > = = = = = 3 n.o. n.o. n.o. 1 2
EE 0.053 > > > > > = = = = = = 2 0 0 2 2
LT 0.055 = = = = = = = = = = = = 3 1 2 3
HU 0.062 > > > > > > > > > > = = = 3 1 2
IE 0.070 > > > > > > > > > > = = = = 2 0
LU 0.101 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 3
Note: Earnings opportunities of three types: low, medium and high parental education.
Our second result (above diagonal in Table 1) concerns the IOp
ranking: H IOp0 is not rejected in 63 over 120 pairwise comparisons
of countries (in this case, we report ‘‘0’’). These countries display
similar levels of IOp as their gap curves coincide for all pairs c ̸=
c ′. The result contrasts the ordering produced by GO (for instance,
GO (UK ) > GO(FI) although H IOp0 is not rejected between these
two countries), thus unveiling the consequences of aggregating
heterogeneity. In each of the remaining cases (57), there exists
at least a pair of types for which gap curves do not coincide
(H IOp0 rejected). If the gap curves cross, the two countries are not
robustly ordered (‘‘n.o.’’) in terms of IOp. Otherwise, gap curves
are clearly ordered, with column-countries in Table 1 robustly
displaying more IOp than row-countries (the table reports the
cases in which dominance in gap curves holds). In a large majority
of comparisons for which H IOp0 is rejected (45/57), countries can
be robustly ordered. In particular, Luxembourg and Ireland are
the most opportunity-unequal countries in Europe, while the UK
and Belgium are robustly ranked as more opportunity unequal
than all the low-IOp countries.
The graphs of the gap curves depict the full heterogeneity in
opportunity gaps within and across countries. Fig. 1 displays gap
curves for the least opportunity-unequal countries (all equal in
terms of GO). In the Netherlands, IOp originates from the earn-
ings penalty attributable to low-educated parents. Conversely,
unfair advantage in Finland is clustered on children raised by
high-educated parents. In both countries, unfair gaps increase
with earnings opportunities, suggesting complementarities be-
tween parental background and distribution factors. Patterns of
disadvantage in Germany resemble that in Finland, with an im-
portant difference: children with low-educated parents suffer a
significant earnings penalty with respect to children with middle-
educated parents, albeit disadvantage is unrelated to distribu-
tional factors. Gap curves dominance allows to conclude that Ger-
many displays robustly more IOp than Finland, an evidence not
captured by IOp indices. Many other cross-country comparisons
display similar patterns.
5. Conclusions
Gap curves are useful to identify and test for robust IOp
rankings of countries. Using distribution regression methods, we
are able to (i) estimate the full distribution of the fairness gaps
implied by a gap curve while (ii) controlling for normatively
irrelevant covariates, two aspects neglected by IOp indices. Our
empirical illustration shows that (i) EOp in Europe is strongly
rejected, (ii) in about half of cross-country comparisons, we are
able to robustly rank countries by IOp, and (iii) even in least
opportunity-unequal countries, gap curves reveal substantial dif-
ferences in the way high or low educated parental background
induces advantages or penalties in earnings, and in the way
(dis)advantage correlates with effort\talents.
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